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before the filing of the petition, the state court's order making the claims for fees "a
prior lien upon the premises" must be considered equivalent to a "direction to pay."
"Direction to pay" is a sensible concept only if it is limited to those cases in which the
court in the prior proceeding intended its order to be executed before reorganization
might ensue. Making a claim for fees a "lien upon the premises" can hardly be said
to indicate an intention that the claim be paid in the immediate future. Thus if the
"direction to pay" concept is to be retained, it should be limited to orders in which
fees are to be paid out of cash on hand or the proceeds of a sale to be held at the same
time. In approving the reduction of fees for "services to be rendered," the court in the
principal case not only suggested a possible limitation on the "direction to pay" concept, but also indicated a possible loophole through which reorganization courts may
find power to reduce prior allowances. As shown above, the court's order must be
considered as a "direction to pay" to sustain its decision as to services already rendered. But to sustain the reduction of fees for "services to be rendered,' it is necessary
to hold that an allowance for future services cannot be a final order even if couched
in terms constituting a "direction to pay." Furthermore, unless allowances in prior
proceedings are clearly labeled as being for past services, reorganization courts may
consider them as being for future services and therefore reducible.
Corporate Reorganization-Consideration of Plan in Conjunction with Foreclosure
Sale-Statutory Redemption-[Illinois].-In a foreclosure proceeding brought by the
trustee under a trust deed, a committee representing the majority bondholders bid in
at the sale, and in addition bought the statutory redemption right of the mortgagor.
The minority bondholders objected to the approval of the sale on the grounds that the
price was too low and that the court had no jurisdiction to consider the reorganization
plan submitted by the majority committee. On a certificate of importance to the
supreme court, held, (i)The court has jurisdiction to consider the reorganization plan
in order to avoid injustice to the parties concerned. The price was not too low when
considered in conjunction with the plan, which was fair. (2) The sale of the redemption
was valid, and by execution under the deficiency decree the trustee can recover the
money paid to the stockholders of the mortgagor. First Nat'l Bk. of Chi. v. Bryn
Mawr Beach Bldg. Corp., 6 N.E. (2d) 654 (Ill. 1937).
In resolving a doubt which had culminated in two conflicting Illinois appellate decisions, this case approves a technique already established in the federal and many state
courts by which injustice to majority as well as minority bondholders may be avoided.
If the court will not scrutinize the plan, fairness to the minority compels the court
to require a bid that will give the dissenter the full value of his interest, i.e., a bid approximating the full going-concern value of the property. But if such a bid is required
the premium on being a dissenter will be so great that it will be difficult to secure sufficient assenters to make reorganization financially possible. This dilemma of unfairness to the dissenter on the one hand, or the stagnation of property caused by the
thwarting of reorganization on the other, can be resolved only if the court considers
the fairness of the plan and bargains for as high a price as is consonant with the effectuation of the reorganization. For a fuller discussion of this problem see Katz, Protection of Minority Bondholders in Foreclosures and Receiverships, 3 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 517 (1936) and especially pp. 524-32; see also, i Gerdes, Corporate Reorganization § 16 (x936).
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The fact that the court will take jurisdiction of a reorganization plan in conjunction with foreclosure proceedings obviates the necessity for statutory redemption. The
mortgagor's redemption right is ordinarily bought by the purchaser of the property
(here the majority committee) in order to effect a "quick-redemption" and to enable
the purchaser to go into possession free from the cloud of the mortgagor's statutory
right of redemption. Conveyance of the redemption right to the purchaser may take
one of the following forms: (i)a bribe to stockholders or directors to induce them to
exert pressure on the corporation to convey to the purchaser; (2) a sale in which the
purchase money is paid to the corporation which then distributes the money to the
stockholders, or (3)a sale in which the purchase money is paid directly to the stockholders. If the first form is employed, the transfer of the right of redemption is fraudulent and voidable; if the third, the sale is absolutely void since the right belongs to the
corporation and not to the stockholders; if the second, the payment to the stockholders
is in fraud of creditors, since the corporation is insolvent. However, if a rule of law requiring the corporation to disgorge the proceeds to creditors is established, the corporation may be reluctant to sell redemption privileges in the future. Whichever construction is taken, then, the ultimate result may be the inability of the purchaser of the
property to remove the redemption cloud.
The simplest solution would be to eliminate statutory redemption. The right was
created: (i) to protect debtors from high personal obligations arising from high deficiency judgments; (2) to enable defaulting debtors to regain their properties; (3) to
protect unsecured creditors from having to share in unencumbered assets with the
holders of an oversized deficiency judgment; (4) to allow creditors to take advantage
of an increase in value of foreclosed property. See Becker and Harbert, Redemptions
from Judicial Sales under the Laws of Illinois, Chicago-Kent Rev., May 1929; Durfee
and Doddridge, Redemption from Foreclosure Sale-the Uniform Mortgage Act, 23
Mich. L. Rev. 825, 835-41 (1925). But in reorganization cases, the insolvency of the
debtor corporation leaves the shareholders unconcerned with the size of the deficiency
judgment, and renders the corporation unable to buy back. And unsecured creditors
may be taken care of either in the reorganization plan, or by judicial reduction of
deficiency judgment to a fair amount regardless of the sale price. See Katz, Protection of Minority Bondholders in Foreclosures and Receiverships, 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
517, 544-48 (1936).
Several ways in which to avoid redemption have been indicated. Some courts, in
cases involving public or quasi-public corporations, have decreed that if the debtor's
property consisted of both realty and personalty and if it were sold en masse, it
should be sold free of any redemption privileges. See Peoria & Springfield Ry. v.
187 (1882); Hammock v. Loan & Trust Co., 105 U.S. 77 (i88i);
Thompson, io3 Ill.
Beet Growers Sugar Co. v. Colum. Trust Co., 3 F. (2d) 755 (C.C.A. 9th 1925). Although this result is prompted by the conviction that this is the only possible way to
get a respectable bid, it clearly runs counter to the redemption statutes. Other courts
have held that consent to receivership proceedings or to joinder of foreclosure with receivership proceedings constitutes a waiver of the right of redemption by the consenting
parties, or subjects them to any decree the court may issue in this regard. Hewitt v.
Walters, 21 Idaho i, I19 Pac. 705 (i911); Beet GrowersSugar Co. v. Colum. Trust Co.,
3 F.(2d) 755 (C.C.A. 9 th 1925); American Mine Equipment Co. v. Illinois Coal Corp.,
31 F.(2d) 507 (C.C.A. 7 th 1929). But the inferences allegedly drawn from such con-
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sent or joinder are hardly justifiable and cannot be made when receiverships or foreclosures are involuntary. Numerous decisions have justified judicial sales free of the
statutory redemption on the theory that the sales were part of dissolution proceedings.
See Blair v. Illinois Steel Co., 159 Ill. 350, 42 N.E. 895 (1896); Watkins v. Minnesota
Thresher Mfg. Co., 41 Minn. 150, 42 N.W. 862 (1889); Home Mtg. Co. v. Sitka Spruce
P. & P. Co., 148 Ore. 502, 36 P. (2d) 1o38 (1934). In fact the dissolution tag has been
stretched to cover a foreclosure under a trust deed joined with a proceeding under a
creditor's bill. American Mine Equipment Co. v. Ill. Coal Corp., 31 F.(2d) 507 (C.C.A.
7th 1929); cf. Duparquet Huot, Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 297 U.S. 216, 220-22 (1936).
None of these decisions satisfactorily defines dissolution proceedings, or distinguishes
them from those proceedings which come within the language of the redemption statutes. It would not be a long step from precedents in these three situations to deny rights
of redemption whenever a judicial sale is incident to corporate reorganization. But
cf. Locey Coal Mines v. Chicago, Will. & Ver. Coal Co., 13I3IIl. 9, 22 N.E. 503 (1889).
Since it is not certain that courts will take this further step, a statutory solution is
desirable. The present Illinois statute allowing a corporate mortgagor to include a
waiver of its redemption right in the mortgage or trust deed (Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev.
Stats. 1935, c. 77, § 18a) is unsatisfactory because (i) it affects only those mortgages
executed after 1933; and (2) it expressly saves the redemption rights given creditors
under the old redemption statute; thus to remove this redemption cloud, the purchaser
at the sale must settle with all creditors having the right to redeem rather than, as
before, settling with the mortgagor alone and effecting a "quick redemption." A
statute, to be adequate should provide that the purchaser of the property of an insolvent corporate debtor takes free from all rights of redemption. For a discussion of the
problems generally involved in redemption, see Durfee and Doddridge, Redemption
from Foreclosure Sale-the Uniform Mortgage Act, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 825 (1925).
Income Tax-Nature of Income-Bid of Mortgagee at Foreclosures as Evidence
of Value of Land--[United States].-The petitioning life insurance company foreclosed
several mortgages on real estate given to secure loans which were in default. At the
foreclosure sales the company was the only bidder, its bid at each sale being the full
amount of the debt plus the accrued interest, irrespective of the value of the land. The
Board of Tax Appeals sustained an income tax assessment as to the interest, refusing
to consider the company's evidence that the land was not worth the amount due as
principal. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 83 F. (2d) 629 (C.C.A. 6th 1936).
On certiorarito the Supreme Court, held, McReynolds, J., dissenting, reversed. For
purposes of income tax, the bid is conclusive evidence that the principal and interest
were paid. Helvering v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 423 (i937).
The decision in the instant case is a product of the arbitrariness of the American
concept of income and of the peculiarity of the American foreclosure sale. In continuing to develop its notion of income, the Court once more adhered strictly to formnot as it did in the cases stemming from Eisner v. Macomber to find realization, but
rather to find gain. The result is in accord with the practice of the Board of Appeals
and with the litigation in the lower federal courts. Helvering v. MissouriState Life Ins.
Co., 78 F. (2d) 778 C.C.A. 8th (i934); National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 4 F.
Supp. iooo (r933).
In finding an interest payment to the taxpayer in the instant case, Mr. Justice

